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UBER AND THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT:
WHY THE RIDE-HAILING APP WOULD NOT FARE WELL UNDER
§ 230
Adeline A. Allen*
ABSTRACT
Uber, a company that offers ride-sharing arrangements
through its smartphone app, has quickly grown in popularity. As
Uber grows in widespread use, injuries involving rides arranged
through Uber have been on the rise. Uber maintains that it is a
technology platform that connects users on its app, not a
transportation company. Such a characterization would render
Uber immune from suits for injuries involving the ride
arrangements under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 (2012). The statute offers robust protection for web-based
companies from liability for content provided by third parties. This
article seeks to consider whether Uber’s business model properly
allows it to be under the protection of the Communications
Decency Act. Given Uber’s roles in setting the price for the ride
and in heavily controlling the connection between passenger and
driver, this article argues that more than a platform, Uber is a
content provider in the ride-sharing arrangement and is thus
disqualified from Communications Decency Act immunity.
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INTRODUCTION
It was New Year’s Eve in San Francisco.1 A mother and her
two young children were walking home through the city after a
visit with the children’s grandmother.2 The family stepped down
the sidewalk, making their way to cross the street, when a driver in
an SUV, making a right turn onto the street, hit them in the

1

This event occurred on December 31, 2013. Ex-Uber Driver Charged with
Manslaughter in Death of 6-Year-Old, TIME (Dec. 9, 2014),
http://time.com/3625556/uber-manslaughter-charge-san-francisco/.
2
Patrick Hoge, Dead Girl’s Family Steps into Legislator’s Insurance Fight
over Uber, Lyft, BIZJOURNALS: TECHFLASH (June 26, 2014, 3:05 PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/techflash/2014/06/uber-lyftinsurance-sofia-liu-susan-bonilla.html.
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crosswalk.3 The mother and her four-year-old son were injured.4
Six-year-old Sofia Liu died from her injuries.5
The driver was driving for Uber,6 a ride-sharing company that
connects passengers and drivers through an app on their phones.7
He was driving around with the Uber app open on his smartphone
while waiting to pick up a fare.8 The driver was later charged with
vehicular manslaughter,9 but in the words of Sofia’s mother, Huan
Hua Kuang, “[W]hat about Uber?”10
This article seeks to explore Uber’s liability when rides
arranged through its app cause injury to bystanders, as in the case
of Sofia Liu’s family, or to its own passengers and drivers. 11
3

See Josh Constine, Uber’s Denial of Liability in Girls’ Death Raises
Accident Accountability Questions, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 2, 2014),
http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/02/should-car-services-provide-insurancewhenever-their-driver-app-is-open/; TIME, supra note 1.
4
Constine, supra note 3; TIME, supra note 1; Hoge, supra note 2.
5
Jay Barmann, Uber Reaches Wrongful Death Settlement with Family of
Sofia
Liu,
SFIST
(July
15,
2015,
10:10
AM),
http://sfist.com/2015/07/15/uber_reaches_wrongful_death_settlem.php;
Constine, supra note 3; TIME, supra note 1; Hoge, supra note 2.
6
Barmann, supra note 5; TIME, supra note 1; David Streitfeld, Uber and a
Child’s
Death,
N.Y.
TIMES:
BITS
(Jan.
27,
2014),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/uber-and-a-childs-death/?_r=0.
7
How Does Uber Work?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/738d1ff7-5fe0-4383b34c-4a2480efd71e (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
8
Barmann, supra note 5; TIME, supra note 1; Streitfeld, supra note 6.
9
Barmann, supra note 5; Carolyn Tyler, Mother of Girl Fatally Struck by
Uber Driver Speaks Out, ABC 7 NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://abc7news.com/business/mother-of-girl-fatally-struck-by-uber-driverspeaks-out/429535/.
10
Tyler, supra note 9; see also TIME, supra note 1.
11
Sofia Liu’s family filed suit against Uber. The parties reached a settlement
for an undisclosed amount in 2015. Barmann, supra note 5; Tracey Lien, Uber
Settles Wrongful-Death Lawsuit in San Francisco, L.A. TIMES (July 15, 2015,
5:53 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-sofia-liu-ubersettlement-20150714-story.html; Streitfeld, supra note 6. Other incidents
include a driver in New York City allegedly crashing into a couple in a
crosswalk, killing the man and injuring the woman; a driver in Los Angeles
allegedly driving under the influence, causing the car to flip over with the
passenger inside; a driver in San Francisco allegedly smashing a passenger’s
face with a hammer, resulting in severe eye injury; and a driver in Hawaii
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Specifically, this article examines whether Uber would qualify for
the protection of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.
allegedly raping a teenage passenger. Injuries are not limited to Uber passengers
or bystanders on the street. Drivers, too, have been injured. For example, a
driver in Los Angeles was allegedly hit by a passenger, breaking his jaw in two
places; while another driver in San Francisco was allegedly attacked by a
passenger, landing him in the hospital with facial injuries. Brad Aaron, Crash
Victim Lawsuit: App Use by Uber Drivers Is Negligent and Illegal,
STREETSBLOG
NYC
(Mar.
20,
2015),
http://www.streetsblog.org/2015/03/20/crash-victim-lawsuit-app-use-by-uberdrivers-is-negligent-and-illegal/; Ellen Huet, Uber Rider Might Lose an Eye
from Driver’s Hammer Attack. Could Uber Be Held Liable?, FORBES (Sept. 30,
2014, 9:37 PM) [hereinafter Uber Rider Might Lose an Eye],
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/09/30/uber-driver-hammer-attackliability/#4acdc5455999; Ellen Huet, What Happens to Uber Drivers and Other
Sharing Economy Workers Injured on the Job?, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2015, 1:15 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/01/06/workers-compensation-uberdrivers-sharing-economy/#62b6fa084c78; Sage Lazzaro, A Hawaii Uber Driver
Has Been Charged with Raping a Teenage Passenger, OBSERVER (Apr. 20, 2016,
2:26 PM), http://observer.com/2016/04/a-hawaii-uber-driver-has-been-chargedwith-raping-a-teenager/; San Francisco Uber Driver Attacked by Passenger,
Suspect Under Arrest, CBS SF BAY AREA (Nov. 28, 2014, 3:49 PM),
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/11/28/san-francisco-uber-driver-attackedby-passenger-suspect-under-arrest-anza-vista-aggravated-assault/; Uber Driver
Arrested on Suspicion of DUI After New Year’s Day Crash, CBS LOS ANGELES
(Jan. 4, 2016, 11:31 PM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2016/01/04/uberdriver-arrested-on-suspicion-of-dui-after-new-years-day-crash/.
Uber
does
maintain some insurance for its drivers, a two-tiered structure of coverage for
(1) the time period between turning on the app and accepting a ride and (2) the
time period between accepting a ride and dropping off the passenger at the
conclusion of the ride. Certificates of Insurance—U.S. Ridesharing, UBER
NEWSROOM (Jan. 11, 2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/certificates-ofinsurance-u-s-ridesharing/. Additionally, Uber also requires drivers to carry
personal auto insurance, many of which offer specific rideshare insurance
policies. Harry Campbell, Rideshare Insurance Options for Uber and Lyft
Drivers,
THE
RIDESHARE
GUY
(Apr.
6,
2016),
http://therideshareguy.com/rideshare-insurance-options-for-drivers/; Ellen Huet,
New Laws Push Uber and Lyft To Bump Up Insurance Coverage, but a
Collision Gap Remains, FORBES (July 1, 2015, 2:30 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/01/new-laws-push-uber-and-lyftto-bump-up-insurance-coverage-but-a-collision-gap-remains/#5d242ceb107c;
Driving Jobs vs. Driving with Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/driver-jobs
(last visited June 29, 2016).
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§ 230 (2012).12 The statute robustly protects interactive computer
services from liability for content provided by a third party.13 A
legendary law in the development of the Internet, the statute has
insulated a host of web companies, 14 from Internet service
providers like Google,15 retail sites like Amazon,16 and social media
sites like Facebook,17 to sharing economy sites like StubHub,18
from a whole host of civil liabilities. 19 Indeed, the statute’s
protection is oft invoked in Silicon Valley.20
Uber contends that it is a technology platform that connects
passengers and drivers as users of its app, not a transportation
company. This characterization is important, as it would usually
invoke the protection of the Communications Decency Act, thus
insulating Uber from suits by any passenger, driver, or bystander.
But given Uber’s practices of setting the price for the ride21 and
heavily controlling the connection between passenger and driver,22
this article argues that Uber is more than a platform, but rather is a

12

Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
See infra Part II.
14
See Claire Cain Miller, When Uber and Airbnb Meet the Real World, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/upshot/when-uberlyft-and-airbnb-meet-the-real-world.html?_r=0.
15
E.g., Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122–23 (E.D. Cal.
2010); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197–99 (N.D. Cal.
2009); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500–01 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
16
E.g., Joseph v. Amazon.com, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1105–07 (W.D.
Wash. 2014); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 43 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001).
17
E.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357–60 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
18
E.g., Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 564 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
19
For example, “[t]hat is why Yelp avoids liability when people post
inaccurate or abusive restaurant reviews, and why YouTube does not have to
remove videos that some find offensive.” Miller, supra note 14; see also infra
note 57.
20
See Uber Rider Might Lose an Eye, supra note 11; Miller, supra note 14.
21
See infra Part III(A).
22
See infra Part III(B).
13
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content provider in the ride-sharing arrangement and is thus
disqualified from Communications Decency Act immunity.23
23

Uber has been involved in a high-profile class action lawsuit brought by its
drivers in California and Massachusetts, in which the drivers argued that they
had been misclassified as independent contractors working for Uber, while they
should have been classified as employees instead. See Shannon Liss-Riordan &
Adelaide Pagano, Breaking News, UBER LAWSUIT 1, 1 (2016),
http://uberlawsuit.com/Breaking%20news%20%20Uber%20will%20pay%20$100%20million%20to%20settle%20independent
%20contractor%20misclassification%20claims.pdf. Legal experts disagree as to
the effect of the classification of these drivers on Uber’s immunity under the
Communications Decency Act. One view is that if drivers were to be classified
as employees, Uber may very well be legally responsible under respondeat
superior for the accidents and injuries caused by its drivers. See Venkat
Balasubramani, Court Says Uber and Lyft Drivers May Be Employees, TECH. &
MKTG.
L.
BLOG
(Mar.
24,
2015),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/03/court-says-uber-and-lyft-driversmay-be-employees.htm.
But Professor Eric Goldman, an Internet Law scholar, opines in his Technology
& Marketing Law Blog that the Communications Decency Act may still
immunize Uber from liability even if its drivers are classified as employees. See
Eric Goldman, Is Uber Liable When Drivers Sexually Abuse Passengers?, TECH.
&
MKTG.
L.
BLOG
(May
17,
2016),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/05/is-uber-liable-when-driverssexually-abuse-passengers-forbes-cross-post.htm. A proposed settlement of
$100 million in the Uber class action suit was rejected by the court in August
2016. See Order Denying Plantiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval at 34,
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18,
2016). But even if a new agreement were to be reached (possibly for a much
smaller class due to a recent Ninth Circuit ruling that the drivers would be bound
by arbitration), such a settlement would leave unresolved the legal issue of
whether the drivers are independent contractors or employees. See Goldman,
supra; Liss-Riordan & Pagano, supra. See generally Mohamed v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., 836 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2016). It is worth noting that the California Labor
Commissioner’s Office, in considering the issue on a separate matter, ruled that
Uber drivers are employees of the company. See Order, Decision or Award of
the Labor Commissioner at 10, Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK
(Labor Comm’r Cal. June 3, 2015); Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, California
Says Uber Driver Is Employee, Not a Contractor, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/business/uber-contests-california-laborruling-that-says-drivers-should-be-employees.html?_r=0.). On the heels of the
aforementioned lawsuit, a new class action lawsuit on the same issue of driver
status misclassification was recently filed in a federal district court in Illinois by
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Part I of this article discusses the rise of Uber and the sharing
economy. Part II discusses the Communications Decency Act and
how courts have interpreted its provisions. Part III explores how
the Communications Decency Act would be applied to Uber and
why Uber would not be immune under the statute.
I. UBER AND THE SHARING ECONOMY
Uber is a ride-sharing app company, self-described as “a
technology platform . . . [that] connect[s] driver-partners and
riders”24 through a smartphone app. The company’s rapid rise in its
short history is astounding. Since the company’s founding in
2009,25 it has grown to expand operations in 540 cities around the
world, 26 taking the taxi and rental car industries by storm 27 (or

drivers outside of California and Massachusetts. See Megan Rose Dickey, Uber
Is Facing a Nationwide Class-Action Lawsuit, TECHCRUNCH (May 2, 2016),
http://techcrunch.com/2016/05/02/uber-is-facing-a-nationwide-class-actionlawsuit/; Erik Sherman, Uber Faces New Class Action Suit by Drivers, FORBES
(May
4,
2016,
5:30
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2016/05/04/will-a-new-class-actionsuit-change-uber-or-cause-drivers-to-permanently-lose/#6212eb71277a.
24
How Does Uber Work?, supra note 7; see also Stephanie Francis Ward,
‘App’ Me a Ride, 100 A.B.A. J., Jan. 2014, at 13–14, 17.
25
See Travis Kalanick, Uber’s Founding, UBER NEWSROOM (Dec. 22, 2010),
https://newsroom.uber.com/ubers-founding/.
26
Our Story, UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story (last visited Nov. 17,
2016).
27
See, e.g., Andrew Bender, Uber’s Astounding Rise: Overtaking Taxis in
Key
Markets,
FORBES
(Apr.
10,
2015,
11:42
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbender/2015/04/10/ubers-astounding-riseovertaking-taxis-in-key-markets/#ac00acd22ef6; Jon Liss, Uber and the Taxi
Industry’s
Last
Stand,
THE
NATION
(Jan.
27,
2015),
http://www.thenation.com/article/uber-and-taxi-industrys-last-stand/;
Dana
Rubinstein, Uber, Lyft, and the End of Taxi History, POLITICO (Oct. 30, 2014,
5:27
AM),
http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/cityhall/story/2014/10/uber-lyft-and-the-end-of-taxi-history-017042; Olivia Zaleski,
Uber Overtakes Rental Cars Among Business Travelers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21,
2016, 3:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-21/uberovertakes-rental-cars-among-business-travelers.
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“disrupting” the industries, as the tech lingo goes), 28 and has
caused massive protests and demonstrations by taxi drivers the
world over.29 One of Silicon Valley’s biggest success stories30 and

28

Compare Clayton M. Christensen et al., What Is Disruptive Innovation?,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptiveinnovation, with Alex Moazed & Nicholas L. Johnson, Why Clayton Christensen
Is Wrong About Uber and Disruptive Innovation, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 27, 2016),
http://techcrunch.com/2016/02/27/why-clayton-christensen-is-wrong-aboutuber-and-disruptive-innovation/.
29
See, e.g., Anti-Uber Protests Around the Worlds, in Pictures, THE
TELEGRAPH,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/picturegalleries/11902080/Anti-Uber-protests-around-the-world-in-pictures.html (last
visited June 14, 2016); Lori Aratani, Downtown D.C. Traffic Gridlocked as Taxi
Drivers Protest Uber, Lyft, Sidecar, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2014/06/25/d-c-taxidrivers-stage-caravan-to-protest-uber-lyft-sidecar/; Bogota Taxi Drivers Protest
Against
Uber,
EURONEWS
(Mar.
15,
2016,
2:50
AM),
http://www.euronews.com/2016/03/15/bogota-taxi-drivers-protest-against-uber/;
Traffic Chaos and Violence as Thousands of Taxi Drivers Protest Against Uber
in
Jakarta,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
22,
2016,
2:23
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/22/traffic-chaos-and-violence-asthousands-of-taxi-drivers-protest-uber-in-jakarta; Gwyn Topham, Black-Cab
Drivers’ Uber Protest Brings London Traffic to a Standstill, THE GUARDIAN
(Feb.
10,
2016,
1:13
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/10/black-cab-drivers-uberprotest-london-traffic-standstill.
30
See Jason Cieslak, What We Can Learn from Uber’s Logo Debacle, FORBES
(Feb.
4,
2016,
5:07
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2016/02/04/what-we-can-learn-fromubers-logo-debacle/#56e7576e2fa8; Maya Kosoff, Has Uber Finally Met Its
Match?,
VANITY
FAIR
(Feb.
25,
2016,
2:54
PM),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/02/has-uber-finally-met-its-match; Sarah
McBride, Ride Service Uber, Brash Darling of Silicon Valley, Stalks New
Markets, REUTERS (Jan. 2, 2014, 1:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ustransport-uber-idUSBREA010SP20140102.
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one of the most powerful companies in the country,31 Uber was
valued at $62.5 billion at the end of 2015.32
The app works as follows: A user, a would-be passenger, logs
into the app when he needs a ride,33 entering his destination into
the app.34 Another user interested in giving him a ride, a would-be
driver, connects with him on the app and starts driving to the
passenger’s location to pick him up and drive him to his
destination. 35 While Uber allows the driver to accept (or not
accept) the passenger’s ride request,36 the passenger cannot choose
31

Dylan Roach & Alex Morrell, The 50 Most Powerful Companies in
America,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Oct.
22,
2015,
12:28
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/50-most-powerful-companies-in-america-201510.
32
Mike Isaac & Leslie Picker, Uber Valuation Put at $62.5 Billion After a
New
Investment
Round,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
3,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/business/dealbook/uber-nears-investmentat-a-62-5-billion-valuation.html?_r=1.
33
See Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43944, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016); How Does Uber Work?, supra note 7. In most cities,
the ride is booked on demand: when the passenger needs the ride and only then.
Hence in those cities, the app does not allow for ride reservations. See Can I
Make a Reservation?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/63165ec1-0910-409e-972f0b8d8df1a605 (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
34
Requesting
and
Taking
an
Uber
Ride,
UBER,
https://help.uber.com/h/2a9d2594-3aea-4f66-9724-32d0da1868d5, (last visited
Nov. 17, 2016).
35
See Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43944, at *4; Requesting and Taking an
Uber Ride, supra note 34.
36
Uber sends the ride request from the passenger to the closest driver, and that
driver has to accept the ride request before the ride between passenger and
driver is arranged. The driver reportedly has fifteen seconds to accept the
request before it is automatically sent to another driver nearby. See Can I
Request a Specific Driver?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/1aaf0913-484f-46959042-e61fc7613f24 (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); James Cook, Uber’s Internal
Charts Show How Its Driver-Rating System Actually Works, BUS. INSIDER (Feb.
11, 2015, 11:53 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/leaked-charts-show-howubers-driver-rating-system-works-2015-2#ixzz3gpV8n1sK. Likely to promote
the speed and efficiency of ride connections, and therefore of the app itself, it
has been reported that Uber demands drivers maintain a ride request acceptance
rate of at least eighty percent. Cook, supra. But see Rachel Emma Silverman &
Lauren Weber, Uber Reaches a Tipping Point with Its Drivers, WALL STREET J.
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his driver.37 The only way for a passenger to get another driver is
by aborting the ride request and starting over.38
Uber sets the price of the ride, which is determined by its
algorithm based on supply and demand at the time the app user
requests a ride.39 At the end of the ride, the app automatically
(Apr. 24, 2016, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-reaches-a-tippingpoint-with-its-drivers-1461490205 (reporting that Uber will soon relax its
requirement for drivers to maintain a high ride request acceptance rate).
Furthermore, the passenger’s destination would not be disclosed to the driver
until after the passenger is picked up, likely to ensure that passengers are
reliably picked up when using the app (as opposed to allowing drivers to shop
for passengers whose destinations are more convenient to them), thus promoting
passengers’ satisfaction with the app. See Harry Campbell, Just How Far Is
Your Uber Driver Willing To Take You?, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2015, 12:33 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/harrycampbell/2015/03/24/just-how-far-is-youruber-driver-willing-to-take-you/#5a0e7075346e; Jessica Hullinger, 16 Things
You Might Not Know About Uber and Its Drivers, MENTAL FLOSS (Jan. 19, 2016,
11:17 AM), http://mentalfloss.com/article/67010/16-things-you-might-notknow-about-uber-and-its-drivers; Jason Koebler, Anatomy of a Seven-Hour,
$583 Uber Ride, MOTHERBOARD (June 17, 2015, 10:24 AM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/anatomy-of-a-seven-hour-583-uber-ride; Joe
Strandell, Can You Beat My Longest Uber Ride Ever?, THE RIDESHARE GUY
(Mar. 17, 2015), http://therideshareguy.com/can-you-beat-my-longest-uber-rideever/.
37
Can I Request a Specific Driver?, supra note 36; see also Can I Make a
Reservation?, supra note 33. United States Senator Ben Sasse made headlines
recently when he decided to drive for Uber for a day to spend time with and
listen to his constituents. One of his passengers, a college student named Adrian
Silva, reported that he was pleasantly surprised upon seeing on the screen that he
was being picked up by Senator Sasse himself. Silva initially thought that this
was a joke, before realizing that it was not. Silva’s reaction of surprise and
initial disbelief makes sense in the context of the fact that Uber passengers do
not choose their drivers. See Cora Lewis, This Guy Got in an Uber and
Discovered His Driver Was a U.S. Senator, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 13, 2016,
3:18
PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/coralewis/ubersenator?utm_term=.glKzvA15V#.ry4r5e9py.
38
See Can I Request a Specific Driver?, supra note 36; Cancelling an Uber
Ride, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/56270015-1d1d-4c08-a460-3b94a090de23
(last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
39
Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43944, at *4; Johanna Interian, Note, Up in
the Air: Harmonizing the Sharing Economy Through Airbnb Regulations, 39
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 152-53 (2016); see also How Are Fares
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charges the passenger’s credit card on file.40 Uber then retains a
percentage of the fare as a fee41 and sends the remainder to the
driver.42 Thus, the system does not allow for negotiations on the
fare between users.43
After the ride, the passenger and the driver rate each other on
the app. 44 Drivers with poor ratings 45 may have their accounts
deactivated by Uber.46

Calculated?,
UBER,
https://help.uber.com/h/33ed4293-383c-4d73-a610d171d3aa5a78 (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); Dan Kedmey, This Is How Uber’s
‘Surge Pricing’ Works, TIME (Dec. 15, 2014), http://time.com/3633469/ubersurge-pricing/;
What
Is
Dynamic
Pricing?,
UBER,
https://help.uber.com/h/34212e8b-d69a-4d8a-a923-095d3075b487 (last visited
Nov. 17, 2016).
40
Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43944, at *4.
41
The fee is typically between twenty to twenty-five percent of the fare.
Silverman & Weber, supra note 36; see also Hullinger, supra note 36.
42
Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43944, at *4.
43
Tipping is not included in the fare, and the practice is not compulsory. In
fact, the app was originally designed so that no cash would change hands
between users. See Can the Uber App Tip My Driver?, UBER,
https://help.uber.com/h/f7385bf5-1748-4fd0-a57f-3d9b62facc45 (last visited
Nov. 17, 2016) (clarifying that tipping is voluntary and emphasizing that “in
most cities, Uber is a cashless experience”). Indeed, tipping is a relatively recent
practice for Uber users as Uber has only recently allowed passengers to tip
drivers, following its $100 million settlement of a class action suit with its
drivers in April 2016. Silverman & Weber, supra note 36. Even with the new
practice of tipping, however, Uber has stated that it had no plans to incorporate
tipping into its app, which would preserve the price-setting of the fare as being
under the exclusive domain of Uber. See id.
44
Driver
Deactivation
Policy—US
ONLY,
UBER,
https://www.uber.com/legal/deactivation-policy/us-multi-lingual/en/ (last visited
June 15, 2016); How Does Uber Work?, supra note 7; see also Hullinger, supra
note 36.
45
A bad rating was once defined by Uber’s San Francisco office, in an
internal document leaked to the media, as less than a “4.6” on a scale of 1 to 5.
Cook, supra note 36. A “4.6” also seems to be the rating required of drivers in
Melbourne, Australia. See How To Get 5-Star Rating?, UBER MELBOURNE,
https://drive.uber.com/melbourne/how-can-we-help/how-to-uber/vicquality/
(last visited June 16, 2016). Uber does state on its website, however, that the
required minimum average rating varies in different cities, allowing for cultural
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Uber is part of the larger so-called sharing economy,
sometimes called “gig” 47 or “on-demand” economy, 48 a
marketplace that is increasingly characterized by users of a
communications platform sharing their resources with each
other—everything from homes to goods to transportation.49 Airbnb,
for example, is a popular website that connects travelers seeking a
space to stay with hosts who list an available space, whether a
private room, an entire house, “tree houses in the woods . . . or
enchanted castles.”50 Users (both hosts and guests) rate each other,
allowing the community to build trust and to measure other users’
dependability.51 StubHub, another popular website, is an online
differences in how users rate each other in the different locales. Driver
Deactivation Policy—US ONLY, supra note 44.
46
Driver Deactivation Policy—US ONLY, supra note 44; see also Harry
Campbell, 11 Things That Can Get You Deactivated as an Uber Driver, THE
RIDESHARE GUY (Oct. 19, 2015), http://therideshareguy.com/10-things-that-canget-you-deactivated-as-an-uber-driver/; Cook, supra note 36.
47
Eric Goldman, Top 10 Internet Law Developments of 2015, TECH. & MKTG.
L. BLOG (Feb. 1, 2016), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/02/top-10internet-law-developments-of-2015-forbes-cross-post.htm.
48
Zalmi Duchman, The On-Demand Economy Is Here To Stay, and Now Is
the Time To Put It To Use for Your Business, FORBES (July 14, 2015, 10:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/zalmiduchman/2015/07/14/the-on-demandeconomy-is-here-to-stay-and-now-is-the-time-to-put-it-to-use-for-yourbusiness/#621c0c5143f8.
49
Brittany McNamara, Note, Airbnb: A Not-So-Safe Resting Place, 13 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 149, 151 (2015); see Charles Green, Trusting and
Being Trusted in the Sharing Economy, FORBES (May 2, 2012, 2:01 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/trustedadvisor/2012/05/02/trusting-and-beingtrusted-in-the-sharing-economy/#703be2e6608a; Randy White, The Sharing
Economy: “Plan B” for Moving America Forward, TEDXSOMA (June 28,
2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2yXFmcl7V8.
50
Who
Can
Host
on
Airbnb?,
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/18/who-can-host-on-airbnb (last visited Feb.
07, 2017); see also McNamara, supra note 49, at 151–55; Tomio Geron, Airbnb
and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:00
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-theunstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/#3ec449326790.
51
How
Do
Reviews
Work?,
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/13/how-do-reviews-work (last visited Nov.
17, 2016); see also It All Starts with Our Standards, AIRBNB,
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ticket marketplace, connecting users who are selling tickets to
sports games, concerts, or shows with other users seeking to buy
the tickets.52
Uber and the web-based sharing economy have grown so
rapidly that there is much uncertainty surrounding how different
laws and regulations should be applied to them.53 Of interest in this
article is how the immunity under the Communications Decency
Act would be applied to Uber.
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
The Communications Decency Act provides that “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”54 Enacted by Congress in 1996, a
key rationale is to promote the development of the then-nascent
Internet 55 and to “encourage the development of technologies
which maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals . . . who use the Internet and other interactive computer
services.” 56 Originally passed to protect interactive computer
services from defamatory content provided by third-party users,
the statute has been expansively applied beyond defamation suits
to protect interactive computer services from fraud, negligence,

https://www.airbnb.com/trust (last visited Nov. 17, 2016); McNamara, supra
note 49, at 152.
52
About Us, STUBHUB, http://www.stubhub.com/about-us/ (last visited June
14, 2016); see also Matthew Feuerman, Note, Court-Side Seats? The
Communications Decency Act and the Potential Threat to StubHub and Peer-toPeer Marketplaces, 57 B.C. L. REV. 227, 228–29 (2016).
53
See Virginia A. Fitt, Electronic Commerce Law: Crowdsourcing the News:
News Organization Liability for iReporters, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1839,
1858 (2011); Interian, supra note 39, at 151–53, 156. See generally McNamara,
supra note 49, at 154–55, 159–70.
54
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
55
See id. § (b)(1).
56
Id. § (b)(3).
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intentional infliction of emotional distress, misrepresentation, and
invasion of privacy.57
Courts have employed a three-pronged test in assessing
whether a defendant should receive immunity under the
Communications Decency Act. A defendant is protected under the
statute when (1) the defendant is a provider or user of an
interactive computer service, (2) the information for which the
plaintiff is suing is provided by another information content
provider, and (3) the lawsuit seeks to treat the defendant as the
publisher or speaker of that information.58 A closer look at each
prong follows.
A. What Is a Provider of an Interactive Computer Service?
An interactive computer service is defined by the statute as
“any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet . . . .” 59
57

Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254
(4th Cir. 2009); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2008);
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007);
Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 726–33 (N.D. Ohio 2007); Doe v.
Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *21 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27,
2006); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539 (E.D. Va.
2003); Matthew Altenberg, Note, Playing the Mysterious Game of Online Love:
Examining an Emerging Trend of Limiting § 230 Immunity of the
Communications Decency Act and the Effects on E-Dating Websites, 32 PACE L.
REV. 922, 938–39 (2012); Feuerman, supra note 52, at 234 (“Originally applied
predominantly to defamation cases, CDA immunity has been interpreted to
apply to any civil suit claiming vicarious liability for websites.”); Dan
Malachowski, Comment, “Username Jacking” in Social Media: Should
Celebrities and Brand Owners Recover from Social Networking Sites when
Their Social Media Usernames Are Stolen?, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 223, 233–34
(2010).
58
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, L.L.C., 755 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir.
2014); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Lycos,
Inc., 478 F.3d at 418; Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 556 (N.C. Ct. App.
2012).
59
§ 230(f)(2).
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Courts have adopted an “expansive definition” of a provider of
an interactive computer service.60 A website, not surprisingly, is a
provider of an interactive computer service as it “functions as an
intermediary by providing a forum for the exchange of information
between third[-]party users.”61 The designation has also included
websites that host message boards62 (even the employer’s e-mail
system), 63 as well as websites that invite or encourage user
comments.64
More specifically, the designation of a provider of an
interactive computer service has been applied to Internet service
providers and search engines such as Google, 65 Yahoo, 66 and
AOL;67 retail sites such as Amazon68 and eBay,69 in which users
“conduct sales transactions” and “provide information (feedback)
about other users of the service”;70 Craigslist, an Internet bulletin

60

Cornelius v. DeLuca, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1021 (D. Idaho 2010); see
Optinrealbig.com, L.L.C. v. Ironport Sys., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1044 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (“Courts construing § 230(f)(2) have recognized that the definition
includes a wide range of cyberspace services, not only internet service
providers.”). This article focuses on the “provider” aspect of an interactive
computer service, not the “user” aspect, as this article seeks to explore Uber’s
liability under the Communications Decency Act, and Uber would be a provider,
not a user of its own service. See infra Part III.
61
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
62
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc., 478 F.3d at 419; Dimeo v. Max, 248 F.
App’x. 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2007); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir.
2003).
63
Delfino v. Agilent Tech., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 389 (Ct. App. 2006).
64
Spreadbury v. Biterroot Pub. Library, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 (D. Mont.
2012).
65
Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122–23 (E.D. Cal. 2010);
Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197–99 (N.D. Cal. 2009);
Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500–01 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
66
Stayart v. Yahoo!, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 885 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
67
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997).
68
Joseph v. Amazon.com, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1105–07 (W.D. Wash.
2014); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
69
Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 714 n.7 (Ct. App. 2002).
70
Id.
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board site;71 Yelp, an online review website; 72 an online dating
website;73 social media sites such as Facebook74 and MySpace;75
and sharing economy sites such as StubHub76 and eBay.77
B. Who Provided the Content?
There is no immunity under the Communications Decency Act
if the online entity itself is the one providing the content, because
the content must have originated from “another information
content provider.”78 An information content provider is defined by
the statute as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or
in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”79
Content “creation” is easier to define than content
“development,” 80 both of which are subsumed under the
Communications Decency Act’s definition of information content

71

Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2008); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d
961, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735 (RMB),
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53246, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009).
72
Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1123 (W.D. Wash. 2014); Reit
v. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413–14 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
73
See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir.
2003).
74
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
75
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008).
76
Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 557 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
77
Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 714 n.7 (Ct. App. 2002).
78
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012); see Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009); MySpace, Inc.,
528 F.3d at 418–19; Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir.
2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030–31, 1031 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003);
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123–24; Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc.,
206 F.3d 980, 984–86 (10th Cir. 2000); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330–31 (4th Cir. 1997).
79
§ 230(f)(3) (emphasis added).
80
Feuerman, supra note 52, at 233; Eric Weslander, Comment, Murky
“Development”: How the Ninth Circuit Exposed Ambiguity Within the
Communications Decency Act, and Why Internet Publishers Should Worry, 48
WASHBURN L.J. 267, 291 (2008).
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provider.81 Certainly a third-party user of a social media site who
posts on the site is the creator of that content (the content being the
post), and the user would therefore be “another information content
provider” under the statute.82 In Doe v. MySpace, Inc., for example,
a minor misrepresented her age as eighteen years old on the social
media website MySpace, which led to an adult contacting her
through the site, subsequently meeting her in person and sexually
assaulting her.83 When the minor’s mother sued MySpace, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed a lower court’s ruling that protected MySpace
from liability under the statute because the minor was the creator
of her own profile.84
As websites have become more interactive, however, as one
commentator put it, “the line between the website and the users of
the website blurs.”85 This is evident in Fair Housing Council of
San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 86 the seminal
Ninth Circuit case that defines what it means to be an information
content provider by way of developing content, rather than creating
it.87
81

See § 230(f)(3).
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Johnson v.
Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd., 591 F.3d at
254–55.
83
MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 416.
84
Id. at 420, 422. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that MySpace
shared the creation of the content with the minor user due to the site’s
facilitating the creation of users’ profiles through a questionnaire and due to the
site’s search feature, ultimately because the plaintiff had failed to present the
argument to the lower court. Id. at 422. The court did, however, signal that the
argument would not have been a winning one. See id. at 420.
85
Weslander, supra note 80, at 293.
86
521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
87
Id. at 1162–63. Roommates.com, a website that connected renters with
those looking for roommates, was held to be a content provider when the
website created discriminatory questions and choice of answers, forcing users to
participate in them by answering the questions as a requirement of using the
website. Id. at 1161–62, 1163, 1167. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the
structure of the website was such that it did not merely provide a framework
which users could then freely use for whatever purpose, be it illegal. Id. at 1172.
The Ninth Circuit contrasted its holding in Roommates with its holding in
82
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Of content development and immunity under the statute, the
court in Roommates stated, “The message to website operators is
clear: If you don’t encourage illegal content, or design your
website to require users to input illegal content, you will be
immune.” 88 In light of this rule, two different tests have been
employed by other courts in determining whether a website’s
content development precludes it from enjoying immunity under
the Communications Decency Act.
Under the more relaxed “encouragement” test, merely
encouraging or inducing the development of illegal content, as
contrasted with providing a neutral framework for users, would
result in the website being deemed a developer of that content and
thus an information content provider.89 Under the more stringent
“requirement” test, a website must have materially contributed to
the illegal content by requiring users to post the content for it to be
deemed a developer of the content and an information content
provider.90
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., in which the defendant dating website was
found not to be a content provider when the website had created the framework
of site usage in the form of questions that users must fill out to use the service,
but the offensive content at issue was created solely by the user. Id. at 1171–72;
cf. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122–24 (9th Cir. 2003).
Although the facts of the case are similar to Roommates, the critical difference is
that in Carafano, the website-created framework did not have to do with the
offensive content at issue—the website played no part in encouraging or
requiring the illegal act. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172.
88
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175 (emphasis added).
89
Jeffrey R. Doty, Note, Inducement or Solicitation? Competing
Interpretations of the “Underlying Illegality” Test in the Wake of Roomates.com,
6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 125, 126–27, 130–32, 136 (2010); Ryan J. P. Dyer,
Comment, The Communication[s] Decency Act Gone Wild: A Case for
Renewing the Presumption Against Preemption, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 837,
845, 860 (2014); Feuerman, supra note 52, at 238; see, e.g., Jones v. Dirty
World Entm’t Recordings, L.L.C., 755 F.3d 398, 414–15 (6th Cir. 2014).
90
Doty, supra note 89, at 126–27, 130–32; Dyer, supra note 89; Feuerman,
supra note 52, at 239; see, e.g., Jones, 755 F.3d at 413–17. For example,
Amazon was not a content provider when it provided tools through its zShops
platform for third-party users to post information on its site and furthermore
encouraged users to use these tools, because users ultimately made their own
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The Ninth Circuit took a rather novel and expansive
interpretation of the statute in Roommates,91 and the case has been
criticized for its “vague and varying articulations” with regard to
the basis of liability, which has led to the two different tests
above.92
The dissent in Roommates also criticizes the majority for
adding the requirement that the content be unlawful for immunity
to attach, when in fact the Communications Decency Act has no
such requirement in its language.93 The dissent points out that the
statute examines only whether the content was provided by the
website, which would be independent from the inquiry of whether
the content was unlawful.94 While the issue in Roommates has to
do with the liability of an information content provider specifically
by way of developing content,95 this unlawfulness requirement has

decision about what information to put on the site. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
91
Feuerman, supra note 52, at 237; Weslander, supra note 80, at 291.
92
Doty, supra note 89, at 130; see Dyer, supra note 89, at 844; see also
Weslander, supra note 80, at 290–94.
93
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
94
Id.
[The majority’s] definition is original to say the least and springs forth
untethered to anything in the statute.
The . . . definition of “development” epitomizes its consistent
collapse of substantive liability with the issue of immunity. Where in
the statute does Congress say anything about unlawfulness? Whether
Roommate is entitled to immunity for publishing and sorting profiles is
wholly distinct from whether Roommate may be liable for violations of
the FHA. Immunity has meaning only when there is something to be
immune from, whether a disease or the violation of a law. It would be
nonsense to claim to be immune only from the innocuous. But the
majority’s immunity analysis is built on substantive liability: to the
majority, CDA immunity depends on whether a webhost
materially contributed to the unlawfulness of the information. Whether
the information at issue is unlawful and whether the webhost has
contributed to its unlawfulness are issues analytically independent of
the determination of immunity. Id.
95
Id. at 1162–63 (majority opinion).
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been picked up and attached to the broader definition of
information content provider.96
It is noteworthy that websites are free to edit content provided
by third-party users without incurring liability as information
content provider.97 This editing function includes choosing which
content authored by third-party users would be published on the
site, 98 making minor alterations to the content, 99 deleting errors
found in the content,100 and making selective content deletion.101
Additionally, courts have been clear that a website is not a
content provider when it “provides a neutral means by which third
parties can post information of their own independent choosing
online.”102 For example, sharing economy website StubHub103 was
not a content provider when its pricing tool on the website did
nothing more than provide information on the prices of tickets to
the same event that had been sold on the site previously.104 The
court said that StubHub’s pricing tool was the “prototypically
‘neutral tool’” because it provided information “without suggesting,
much less requiring” users to set any particular price on the
tickets.105 Rather, third-party sellers as users set their own prices on
the site.106 Google went a step further than StubHub by providing
suggestions of certain keywords to bidders in its AdWords
program, 107 but it too was found not to have been a content
96

See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250,
254 (4th Cir. 2009); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008).
97
See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003).
98
Barrett v. Fonorow, 799 N.E.2d 916, 926–27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
99
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.
100
Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th
Cir. 2000).
101
Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 726 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
102
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also
Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
103
See About Us, STUBHUB, supra note 52.
104
Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 562 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 561–62.
107
Jurin v. Google, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
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provider under the statute because the bidders could still “adopt or
reject [the keywords] at their discretion.” 108 In so doing, the
program merely helped bidders “refine their content,”109 and so it
was a “neutral tool” for bidders as users of the site.110
Lastly, it is noteworthy that the court in StubHub found the
sharing economy website111 immune when its business model was
such that it was a “broker” in connecting users, who were buyers
and sellers of tickets to various events, to conduct their own
transactions (with the sellers setting the price, as discussed
above).112 Put another way, StubHub’s website was the meeting
place for these users who were interested in buying and selling
tickets, and users were free to make their own interactions and
sales 113 —StubHub did not systematically require certain user
connections or sales to occur, or, conversely, restrict connections
or sales between any particular users.114 This brokering function is
apparent in Airbnb, for example, being another sharing economy
website, which also neither systematically requires certain user
connections or bookings to occur nor restricts them from
occurring.115
C. What Is a Publisher?
As the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals explained,
“Although the [Communications Decency Act] does not define
‘publisher,’ its ordinary meaning is ‘one that makes public,’ and
‘the reproducer of a work intended for public consumption.’
Indeed, the very essence of publishing is making the decision
whether to print or retract a given piece of content . . . .”116 Thus,
108

Id.
Id.
110
Id.
111
See About Us, STUBHUB, supra note 52.
112
Hill v. StubHub, Inc.,727 S.E.2d 550, 552, 563 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
113
See id. at 552–53, 561–63.
114
See id. at 561–63.
115
See Interian, supra note 39, at 153.
116
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted).
109
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the function of a publisher includes choosing what to publish
among proffered material, 117 editing, archiving, caching,
monitoring, screening, providing access to, postponing, and
deleting content118—or conversely, deciding not to do anything to
the content at all.119
The broad definition has, not surprisingly, yielded a
designation of publisher to an array of types of websites, from
Internet service providers and search engines such as Google,120
Yahoo, 121 and AOL; 122 retail sites like Amazon 123 and eBay; 124
Craigslist, an Internet bulletin board site;125 Yelp, an online review
website;126 an online dating website;127 social media sites such as
Facebook 128 and MySpace; 129 to sharing economy sites such as
StubHub130 and eBay.131

117

Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003).
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III. WHY UBER WOULD NOT BE IMMUNE UNDER THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
How would Uber fare under the Communications Decency
Act? Uber has been steadfast in its characterization that it is not a
transportation company, but rather a technology company, one that
provides a ride-sharing platform for users to connect by soliciting
rides from and generate ratings for each other.132 In other words,
Uber would argue that it would qualify for immunity under the
Communications Decency Act as a tech platform—that it is just
like other tech platforms and websites that have found to be
immune under the statute. As late as 2014, Uber’s in-house
attorney likened getting a ride using the Uber app to arranging a
ride with a friend on Facebook: “If you . . . got in an accident, . . .
the social media site [Facebook] would not be liable.”133
It is telling that a federal district court in California (in an order
denying Uber’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of
whether Uber’s drivers should be categorized as employees, which
took place before Uber’s ensuing settlement with its drivers)

132

See Order Denying Defendant Uber Techs., Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 10, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 11, 2015) (No. C-13-3826 EMC); Order, Decision or Award of the Labor
Commissioner at 9, Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK (Labor
Comm’r Cal. June 16, 2015); Ward, supra note 24, at 14; Huet, supra note 11;
Legal Terms and Conditions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/other/USterms-pre-Nov-2016/ (last visited June 29, 2016).
The Services constitute a technology platform that enables users of
Uber’s mobile applications or websites provided as part of the Services
(each, an “Application”) to arrange and schedule transportation and/or
logistics services with third party providers of such services, including
independent third party transportation providers and third party
logistics providers under agreement with Uber or certain of Uber’s
affiliates (“Third Party Providers”) . . . . YOU ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT UBER DOES NOT PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION OR
LOGISTICS SERVICES OR FUNCTION AS A TRANSPORTATION
CARRIER.
Legal Terms and Conditions, supra.
133
Ward, supra note 24, at 14, 17.
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rejected Uber’s characterization of itself as merely a technology
company as “fatally flawed.”134
Uber’s self-definition as a mere “technology company”
focuses exclusively on the mechanics of its platform (i.e.,
the use of internet enabled smartphones and software
applications) rather than on the substance of what Uber
actually does (i.e., enable customers to book and receive
rides). This is an unduly narrow frame. Uber engineered a
software method to connect drivers with passengers, but
this is merely one instrumentality used in the context of its
larger business. Uber does not simply sell software; it sells
rides. Uber is no more a “technology company” than
Yellow Cab is a “technology company” because it uses CB
radios to dispatch taxi cabs, John Deere is a “technology
company” because it uses computers and robots to
manufacture lawn mowers, or Domino Sugar is a
“technology company” because it uses modern irrigation
techniques to grow its sugar cane. Indeed, very few (if any)
firms are not technology companies if one focuses solely
on how they create or distribute their products. If, however,
the focus is on the substance of what the firm actually does
(e.g., sells cab rides, lawn mowers, or sugar), it is clear that
Uber is most certainly a transportation company, albeit a
technologically sophisticated one. In fact, as noted above,
Uber’s own marketing bears this out, referring to Uber as
“Everyone’s Private Driver,” and describing Uber as a
“transportation system” and the “best transportation service
in San Francisco.”135
Indeed, while some analysts have called for Communications
Decency Act immunity to be extended to Uber, largely as a
measure to protect the growth of the sharing economy industry,136
134

Order Denying Defendant Uber Techs., Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (No. C-13-3826 EMC).
135
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136
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many have argued for a contraction of Communications Decency
Act immunity as the Internet has grown immensely since the
passage of the Act and argued for a limitation of how the immunity
should be applied to sharing economy businesses in particular.137
Much is unsettled about how Communications Decency Act
immunity would be fitted to sharing economy businesses,138 but as
will be shown below, Uber’s particular business model would
disqualify the company from enjoying immunity under the statute.
Uber would likely easily meet the first and third prongs of the
test for immunity: whether the website is a provider of an
interactive computer service 139 and whether the website is the
publisher of the content, respectively.140 With regard to the first
prong, as courts have been expansive in their definition of a
provider of an interactive computer service, 141 there has been
consistency in finding websites of all types to be providers of an
interactive computer service.142 StubHub, for example, a sharing
137

Altenberg, supra note 57, at 948–53; Dyer, supra note 89, at 841–42, 855–
58; Interian, supra note 39, at 160–61; see also Weslander, supra note 80, at 278,
284.
“[F]or websites, this [expectation against liability] is codified in law—
they are not legally responsible for what their users publish, according
to the Communications Decency Act, perhaps the most influential law
in the development of the web. That is why Yelp avoids liability when
people post inaccurate or abusive restaurant reviews, and why
YouTube does not have to remove videos that some find offensive.
The law protects online speech, not actions people take in the
offline world. Yet its ethos has permeated Silicon Valley so deeply that
people invoke it even for things that happen offline.
‘These folks grew up in a world where platforms are not
responsible, and then when they go do stuff in the real world, they
expect that to be the case,’ said Ryan Calo, an assistant professor at the
University of Washington law school who studies cyber law.”
Miller, supra note 14.
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See Fitt, supra note 53; Interian, supra note 39, at 151–53, 156. See
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economy website like Uber, has been found to be a provider.143 As
Uber provides access to its Internet-based app for its users
(passengers and drivers) and provides a forum through its app for
users to exchange information for the purposes of arranging a
ride,144 Uber would be a provider of an interactive computer service
under the statute, thus satisfying the first prong.
With regard to the third prong, courts have similarly been
liberal in defining what a publisher is. 145 A generous range of
activities by websites of all types has qualified under the function
of a publisher. 146 Of note, StubHub, again, being a sharing
economy website, has been found to be a publisher. 147 Uber’s
activity in connecting passengers and drivers for their ride on its
app148 would likely fall under the function of a publisher under the
statute, thus satisfying the third prong.
But Uber would have difficulty meeting the second prong:
whether a third party provided the content on the computer
service.149 While passengers and drivers do provide some content
as third-party users of the app—first by signing up to use the Uber
app, then by requesting a ride as a passenger and by responding to
a ride request as a driver150—Uber also provides content by setting
the price of the ride and by commanding heavy control over user
ride connections.
A. Price-Setting and Providing Content
As Uber sets the price for the ride,151 Uber creates that piece of
information in the interaction between its third-party users.
Passengers and drivers as users have no say or contribution to the

143
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price; this content is created solely by Uber.152 Uber’s role here as a
content creator is more easily discernible than some other websites’
role as a content developer to an extent that would trigger liability,
as the Roommates court was concerned,153 because Uber actually
creates the content by setting the price outright.
Neither does Uber’s price-setting mechanism function as a
neutral tool for users, as would be required so as not to be a
content provider.154 Of the two websites whose mechanisms were
found to be neutral tools discussed previously, StubHub and
Google,155 it is precisely because StubHub’s pricing tool neither
suggested nor required sellers to sell their event tickets at any
particular price that it was found to be a “neutral tool” for users;
sellers were free to choose whatever price at which to list their
tickets. 156 Similarly, although Google’s AdWords program
provided suggestions of certain keywords, it did not require users
to take up those keywords, and it was found to be a “neutral tool”
for users.157 Bidders could still “adopt or reject [the keywords] at
their discretion.”158
Uber’s price-setting mechanism stands in stark contrast to these
two tools: It requires users to agree to a price for the ride set by
Uber through its algorithm without any input from users,159 and
thus is not a neutral tool for users. As such, this mechanism goes
beyond being an editing function permitted for websites within the
prong160 (after all, there is no content to edit if users have no input
whatsoever on the price of the ride)—it is providing the content
itself.

152
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It is true that the context for Uber differs from many
Communications Decency Act cases in that the reason Uber would
be sued is likely not because the price being set by Uber is per se
unlawful,161 but because the ride connection made through Uber
has caused some sort of an accident or injury due to negligence or
intentional acts.162 In this scenario, though, the event that would
likely trigger the lawsuit would not happen without the ride
connection having been made through Uber, and the price of the
ride is a necessary part of that connection, with Uber being the
entity that sets the price. The price of the ride being set by Uber is
not severable from the injury-causing ride itself.
A better analysis of the scenario, however, would examine
Uber’s role as a content provider by setting the price against the
plain language of the Communications Decency Act. There is
nothing in the statute that requires the content at issue to be
unlawful—the statute examines only whether the content was
provided by a third-party for immunity to attach.163 Indeed, it is
revealing that in the aforementioned Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,164 the
court does not distinguish between the content that was itself
unlawful in nature 165 and the content that led to the unlawful
event.166
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As opposed to, for example, a website being sued for a defamatory posting
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the role of content provider by setting the price for the ride between third-party
users. See sources cited supra notes 39, 43.
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Thus the analysis for Uber should be focused on the price as
the content being set solely by Uber, independent of whether that
content is unlawful. Uber creates the content that is the price of the
ride for its users, and that role should suffice to render Uber as an
information content provider.167
B. Controlling User Connections and Providing Content
Additionally, Uber controls aspects of user connections by
sending a passenger’s ride request to a particular driver168 and by
not allowing passengers to pick their drivers.169 As far as thirdparty users using the app are concerned, the app does not provide a
neutral means for them to connect with other users freely.
To elaborate, while there is some freedom for a driver to accept
or decline a ride request,170 a driver is not given access on the app
to see all ride requests being made on Uber (or to choose from that
pool).171 Rather, ride requests come to him one at a time, delegated
by Uber. 172 For a passenger, there is much less freedom. The
passenger has no choice in drivers.173 Once the ride request has
been accepted by a driver, the only way out of the now-already
167
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arranged ride is for the passenger to abort the ride and make a new
request.174 These systemic restrictions do not make for a “neutral
tool” for users to make connections of their own “independent
choosing,” as would be required of a website so as not to be a
content provider.175
It is true that websites are afforded an editing function within
the prong without incurring liability as a content provider.176 But
selecting which content would be published or making alterations
to content—both permitted within the editing function 177 —is
incongruous to channeling user connection systematically, as the
latter is much more than editing. It is actively forming user
connections and thus generating content.
It is helpful to consider how other sharing economy websites
such as StubHub and Airbnb freely allow users to make their own
connections with each other.178 There are no restrictions for sellers
and buyers of tickets to conduct a sale with each other on
StubHub,179 and there are no restrictions for travelers and hosts to
book a space with each other on Airbnb.180
This “broker[ing]” function181 in connecting users represents
the free marketplace espoused by the requirement of a neutral tool
for users, 182 and a platform that allows for open connections
between users is important to the determination that a website was
not a content provider.183 Uber fails to provide a neutral tool for
users by heavily controlling user connections and thus exposes
itself to liability as an information content provider.
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C. Providing Content and Losing Immunity
Given that Uber sets the price of the ride and heavily controls
user connections, it is an information content provider under the
Communications Decency Act. But the two practices are not
dependent on each other in making Uber a content provider. As the
analysis above shows, either practice is sufficient to render Uber a
content provider.184 Thus, it would be too narrow of a construction
to classify Uber as a content provider only from the moment a
driver accepts a ride request from a particular passenger to the
conclusion of the ride (because that is the timeframe in which
Uber’s algorithm has set the price for the ride and the system has
channeled the users to connect with each other).
A more appropriate construction would categorize Uber as a
content provider from the time the app is turned on by a driver
seeking to pick up a ride, because turning on the app engages the
Uber app system, which, among other functions, starts to engineer
the channeling of user connections, even if it has yet to set a
price.185 This position would render Uber a content provider in
Sofia Liu’s case, and thus unprotected by the Communications
Decency Act, because the driver had turned on the app and was
waiting for a ride request to come through when he struck the
family with his car.186
Given that Uber is a content provider in the ride-sharing
arrangement between users, immunity under the Communications
Decency Act would not be properly conferred on the company
when passengers, drivers, or bystanders sue Uber for an injury
involving an Uber ride. Indeed, giving immunity under the statute
when Uber sets the price for the ride would seem to be antithetical
to the expressly stated Congressional policy behind the statute, to
“encourage the development of technologies which maximize user
control,”187 because price-setting does not maximize user control.
In the same manner, giving immunity when Uber commands so
184
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much control over user connections does not maximize user
control.
CONCLUSION
As Uber’s popularity increases and more people use its app to
arrange ride-sharing, injuries to bystanders to the ride, as well as to
passengers and drivers, have correspondingly increased. Uber
asserts that it is a technology platform as opposed to a
transportation company—a claim that would usually trigger the
protection of the Communications Decency Act, which would
insulate Uber from lawsuits for injuries involving those rides. The
statute has robustly protected Web-based companies from liability
based on content provided by third parties.
But Uber employs a distinctive business model to other Webbased companies that have been protected by the statute. First,
Uber sets the price for the transactions between its users, creating
that piece of information in the interaction between its third-party
users. Uber’s price-setting mechanism function does not offer its
users a neutral tool in using the app. Second, Uber exercises heavy
control in user connections by orchestrating much of the ride
connection between passenger and driver. As far as third-party
users using the app are concerned, the app does not provide a
neutral tool for them to make connections of their own independent
choosing.
These practices cause Uber to be more than just a technology
platform—it is a content provider in the ride-sharing arrangement
through its app. As a content provider, Uber would thus not qualify
for immunity under the Communications Decency Act.

